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POWER AND POLICY. By Thomas K. Finletter.
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. Pp. viii, 408.

New York:
$4.50.

Note: The following is the substance of remarks by Professor Leach and
Secretary Petersen at a Book Programon February 9, 1955, at the
University of PennsylvaniaLaw School.
AN

AIR FORCE CONSULTANT'S REVIEW

Thomas K. Finletter is a student and participant in American Government, particularly those aspects dealing with foreign and military policy.
As Chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission of 1947 he with
his colleagues produced the "Finletter Report" on Survival in the Air Age.
During his tenure as Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53, he was the
civilian custodian of a major segment of national power. This present
volume, "Power and Policy," might well be entitled The Second Finletter
Report. If it be true as often stated that wars are not won, but lost; and
if this includes cold wars and part-way wars as well as hot wars, these
products of Mr. Finletter's mind and pen may well save the United States
from those disastrous mistakes that have caused nations to fall and
civilization perish.
The book is divided into four Parts, which I should describe as follows:
Part

I:

Part

II:

Strategy to protect the United States and NATO against
the big-war threat posed by the Soviet Union armed with
atomic weapons.
Strategy to conduct the struggle against Communism in
the East.

Part IIn:

Military policy and forces required to support the global
strategy of the United States, as defined in Parts I and
II, and an evaluation of existing policy and administrative
machinery.

Part IV:

The search for peace through collective security and disarmament in the age of nuclear weapons.

I propose to deal only with Part III which, though largely neglected
by the reviewers and commentators, seems to me the book's most significant
contribution. Anything that may be written about strategy in Europe or
Asia necessarily deals with the political alignments of the moment and the
current state of technological progress. Since these can and do change
rapidly, the first requirement for a sound global policy is a defense
mechanism capable of firm decision and rapid change. If our decision(698)
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making process is effective we may make an occasional error, but we can
correct it as defects emerge or new factors appear in the equation. However, lacking an effective decision-making process, we cease to be masters
of our fate. The strength of a giant is useless if his befuddled brain leaves
him in a constant state of hopeless indecision. Goliath, or his current
national equivalent, is unlikely to survive under such circumstances.
Mr. Finletter's Part III, "U. S. Military Policy," is a shocker. It is
testinony, not opinion, from one who as Secretary of the Air Force has
seen the inner workings of the Department of Defense. Nearly everything
he says has been published at one time or another in leaked information to
the press; but one could never be sure that these items were the truth, and
one could be very sure indeed that they were not the whole truth. Furthermore, these items have never been put together to form a coherent pattern. Thanks to Mr. Finletter's courage, initiative and analytical ability,
this has now been done.
Ex-Secretary Finletter is a Democrat. But he served in the Department of Defense when the words Democrat and Republican had very little
significance. His superior, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, was
a Republican working under a Democratic president. Among his group of
advisers from civilian life there were Republicans (including myself) and
Democrats, and no attention was paid to this political differentiation. This
book of Mr. Finletter's is no political diatribe by a disgruntled lame duck.
It is an impeachment of practices and failures of Democrats and Republicans alike.
I should like to mention three items of specific testimony presented by
Mr. Finletter.
First, he says that the Air Force and the Navy are building two competing and duplicating weapons systems to perform the same air-atomic
mission, at a total cost of the order of $12 billion annually and that there
has been no decision as to what part, if any, the carrier-based planes of
the Navy are to play in the operation.
"There is duplication in the planning for the NATO Air-Atomic
mission. The U.S. Air Force regards itself as having the whole responsibility; it welcomes such help as the Navy may provide; but it
is not free to give up any part of its task. The Navy also is preparing
to take part in the operation but its responsibility is not fixed..
It duplicates forces for the same task, and therefore wastes nwneyand this duplication runs into billions of dollars every year. .
"Now the point about this problem is not that a wrong decision has
been made as to the respective roles of the Air Force's land-based
planes and the Navy's carrier-based aircraft, but that no decision at all
has been made" (p. 203). (Italics supplied.)
Thus when the author seeks to determine the proper level of annual defense
appropriations he has to place the figure of $12 billion for the Air-Atomic
mission in an indeterminate status between the Navy and the Air Force
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with a note that this amount is "to be allocated to Navy or Air Force after
a decision by the President on recommendation of the Secretary of Defense
as to the best method of carrying out the NATO Atomic-Air operation"
(p. 224).
There is confirmatory evidence on this subject to which Mr. Finletter's
book does not refer. In the spring of 1953 the Boston Herald, puzzled by
a statement made in a Navy League publication, wrote to the Secretaries
of the Navy and the Air Force asking whether some responsible joint body
had made a computation of the comparative cost of carrying out the atomicair offensive by land-based or carrier-based aircraft. Both Secretaries
stated to the Herald that no such study had been made and that none was
contemplated; one thought such a study should be made, the other not.
Year after year the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses of
Congress spend long hearings in line-by-line scrutiny of the budgets of the
three military departments. The usual result is a reduction of about three
per cent-say one billion dollars out of a requested 35 billion. The Committee challenges a research project here or a number.of military police
there, postpones a construction project until a later year, and such like.
This process calls upon the committee to sit in review upon the detailed
work of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, each of whom with a thoroughly experienced
staff has already gone over the budget with a fine-tooth comb to eliminate
any possibility of wastage of this type. The search for economy in military
outlays is one in which every taxpayer has an interest, and the Appropriations Committees a responsibility. But it is difficult to understand why
these committees-and especially such advocates of economy as Senator
Byrd and Representatives Taber and Reed-should focus their attention
upon such low-yield items as military policemen while the duplication recounted by Mr. Finletter is taking place year after year at a cost to the
nation in billions of dollars which could make the difference between budget
deficit and surplus, between continued high taxes and tax reduction.
Second, Mr. Finletter says that just once since V-J Day have the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ever been allowed to express their uninhibited views
as to the needs of this country for its own defense. That one occasion was
in 1951. Every other time, he says, the Chiefs of Staff have been told in
substance that their job was to divide a pot of money or a pool of manpower that had been fixed by others, usually economic and fiscal authorities (pp. 261-63, 270). Now this, if true, is a most unusual way to run
a railroad. You have military advisors who are the top professionals in
their services and you tell them not to give military advice because it might
turn out to cost too much. Furthermore, it has been stated, though not by
Mr. Finletter in this book, that it is a common practice for pressure to be
brought upon the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go before the
Congress and testify that they have not been restricted by manpower or
money ceilings and that the forces provided are adequate in their unfettered
military judgment.
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Third, Mr. Finletter says that, even in the matter of dividing the pot
of money or pool of manpower, the division is not made on the basis of
first-things-first, second-things-second, and third-things-out-the-window.
Instead there is a division-by-services which tends to produce approximately
equal distributions of men and money between Army, Navy/Marines and
Air Force. Even when the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree upon an allocation
of money and men on the basis of national priority rather than service
equality, Mr. Finletter declares that administrative action is likely to nullify
the agreement. As above stated, the one occasion when the joint Chiefs
of Staff were permitted to state the real national need in forces was 1951.
This was reflected in the defense budget for Fiscal Year 1953 by an
allocation of $20.5 billion to the Air Force. In the budget for Fiscal Year
1954, prepared by the outgoing Truman administration, the Air Force was
reduced to $16.7 billion-a reduction which Mr. Finletter vigorously protested; but even this amount was larger than the funds allocated to the
Army and the Navy/Marines. The Eisenhower Administration found as
Item 1 on its agenda this budget. Here is Mr. Finletter's description of
what took place:
"The review in the spring of 1953 of the fiscal year 1954 budget
which had been prepared by the Truman Administration was made by
the civilian officials of the Department of Defense, as it should have
been. . . . But if the Secretary of Defense is to make this recommendation he should make it only . . . after hearing, exhaustively,

the military case from the civilian and uniformed heads of the three
Services.
"The review of the fiscal year 1954 budget and of the force levels
which this budget was calculated to support was not made in this
way.

.

. . An arbitrary cut-back in the dollars allocated to each of

the Services was made in such amounts as to restore the roughly equal
division of the Defense dollar among the three Services. Practically
all of the cut came out of the Air Force which was reduced from the
previous year's appropriation of $20.5 billion to $11.4 billion, rather
than to $16.7 billion as had been planned in the Truman budget. And
this was done without consulting the Joint Chiefs or any qualified
military men, purely on the recommendations of the budget officials
of the Department of Defense and economic experts in other parts of
the Government" (pp. 269-70). (Italics supplied.)
Mr. Finletter's book has now been before the public for more than six
months, yet none of his statements and charges have been denied or refuted.
The statute of limitations is just about running out on the possibility of
serious challenge. The defendant must be considered guilty as chargedand the defendant is the system, as applied by Republicans and Democrats
alike, as applied to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and as applied
against the national security.
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I have selected from Mr. Finletter's book only a few of his astute
analytical comments on our defense organism-the tendency to make many
little decisions anid avoid the big ones, to sweep under the rug facts that
might be unpalatable to a segment of the military establishment and lead to
an "interservice squabble," to determine the overall size of the military
establishment on fiscal and economic grounds and then leave to the military
experts only the problem of dividing a predetermined total, and to encourage
the three military Services to divide men and money equally among themselves. There are others, but the ones here recounted are so serious as to
demand correctives by administrator, legislator and citizen.
This is a courageous book. It is not inconceivable, to put it mildly,
that there will be another Democratic administration during the years of
Mr. Finletter's vigorous maturity. If this happens, he is obviously a man
to be considered for very high position in the areas of foreign and defense
policy. In this book he has rarely named a name, though it must have been
a bitter deprivation not to do so. Yet those who follow these things know
well whom he is talking about, and these latter will have no difficulty in
identifying themselves. Will they gang up on him when the time comes?
Will he be "too controversial" or "an air power extremist" or "a trouble
maker"? Perhaps-and perhaps not. When this type of question arises
it is pleasant to reflect upon the career of a man who could be ordered to
obey every command except "shush"-Arthur W. Radford. Admiral
Radford led the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949 in which he opposed the
policies of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and spoke out in
open sessions of the House Armed Services Committee over the direct disapproval of the Secretary of the Navy. He is now Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the highest military position in the land. This is a most
encouraging sequence of events. Perhaps we really do mean what we say
in the Constitution about freedom of expression to the public and the
propriety of placing before Congress all information and opinions that can
help them in performing their function under our system of constitutional
separation of powers.
W. Barton Leach t

A

WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY'S REVIEW

Mr. Finletter's book is a thoughtful and provocative consideration of
United States military power in this atomic age. It is lucid and well
written and comes from a man who, through distinguished service in such
capacities as Secretary of Air, has gained an expert and inside opinion on
t Professor at Harvard Law School and Harvard Graduate School of Public
Administration, Brigadier General United States Air Force Reserve. Professor
Leach has acted as a Civilian Consultant to the Air Force since the termination
of his active service in World War II. At present, in collaboration with colleagues
at Harvard, he is giving a Graduate Seminar in Defense Policy and Administration
in the United States.
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the important matters about which he writes. Though some of his central
conclusions are extreme-and I disagree sharply with them-the process
by which he arrives at them should be employed in reaching better balanced
positions. The controversy his conclusions may provoke will itself contribute to the solution of the all-serious problems of the size and composition of our armed forces. Mr. Finletter has made in lawyer-like and logical
fashion his determination of these problems based on our foreign policy and
the strategic concepts he adopts.
This is a "big" air-force book, but more than that, it is a plea for a
vastly superior atomic air force-superior to what we have now and to that
which the Russians may possess. No one can seriously quarrel with this
assessment of the top priority for our armed forces, nor with the importance
he gives in next order of priority to defense against atomic attack and to
our relatively limited ground force commitment to NATO. My disagreement is one of degree, because when you cut the finite pie of our defense
expenditures in the author's fashion, you have much too little left for nonatomic navy or ground forces.
This, Mr. Finletter argues, fits our present and prospective situation.
It is his fundamental thesis that any general war will involve use of nuclear
weapons and that unless our preparations contribute to atomic war, we
should not spend much money on them. War is to be decided within
days, perhaps hours, after it starts. Mr. Finletter also argues that partly
because of the public distaste for Korea (a local war), we will not engage
in local or limited wars where, no doubt, conventional weapons alone would
be employed.
I am not willing to cast aside the possibility, as is Mr. Finletter, that
we could be involved in a general war in which neither side employed its
nuclear arms. The recent revelations of the radio-active-fall-out effects
of the hydrogen bomb show the world suicide probabilities of a nuclear war.
In spite of all the atom-bomb shaking of much of our diplomacy and of virtually all that of the Soviets, there is a vast difference between words
before the fact and the act of triggering a world holocaust. And certainly
our planning must include conventional general war as a real possibility.
Thus I cannot agree with Mr. Finletter that we should give up expensive
General Purpose Forces until we have completely satisfied the more vital
atomic priorities; or that we should now treat as a myth that conventional
industrial preparedness wins wars.
The author states, "Nor should our military planners list as part of
the US force-in-being US military units for local wars. We have announced our national policy not to get into any more local wars" (p. 240).
This book was published late last fall. Would the present Formosan crisis
-the defense of the island, the evacuation of Tachens, the touchy situation of Quemoy and Matsu-suggest that we need not plan on the possibility of local wars? The pattern of Russian aggression in the past suggests that for years we may have to meet such threats to peace in all parts
of the globe with conventional military forces. This means adequate provi-
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sion for General Purpose Forces including many foot sloggers whom the
author would substantially supplant by air men carrying atomic weapons.
Recommended highly are the author's discussion of the shocking waste
involved in having both the Navy and Air Force in competing atomic air
roles, of the unscientific nature of military-force-level decisions and of the
defects in the organization of the Department of Defense.
Howard C. Petersent

JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON. By Donald G. Morgan. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. xv, 326.
$6.50.
Despite some excellent recent work on Johnson, some of which appeared in the pages of this Review,1 I had not before reading this volume
been a devotee in the small but intense Johnson cult. It had seemed to me
a little that Johnson was a flighty, crotchety, garrulous man who was being
"discovered" largely because historians like triumvirates, and Marshall and
Story seemed not quite enough ornament for the Supreme Court for the
first quarter of its history. But Donald Morgan's book goes a long way to
making another convert; Johnson deserves the epithets, but he had courage
and consequence, too.
William Johnson was born in South Carolina in 1771. His father
was an ardent rebel, and the family suffered bitterly for its loyalty to the
new Republic. After the war young Johnson studied at Princeton, and he
learned his law in the office of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. In 1794 he
became a member of the state legislature and progressed to Speaker in
three terms. In 1799, at the age of 27, he became a judge of the South
Carolina Appeals Court and in 1804 Thomas Jefferson placed him on the
Supreme Court of the United States. There he sat until his death in 1834.
The oft-told tragedy of the Jeffersonian presidents was their inability
to pick Supreme Court justices who would stand hitched. Johnson and
Story are the classic examples. For the more than twenty years remaining
of his life, Jefferson thought of Marshall as his arch political enemy, the
symbol of everything wrong with the constitutional system. Throughout
those years, Johnson almost invariably stood with Marshall.
This is not to say that there was never any variance; Morgan tells
how Jefferson stirred up Johnson to try to break the Marshall monopoly
on the important opinions of the court, and Johnson did write more than

t President, Fidelity-Philadelphia
Assistant Secretary of War.
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1. Schroeder, The Life and Judicial Work of Justice William Johnson, Jr., 95
U. o F PA. L. REv. 164, 344 (1946, 1947). See also Levin, Mr. Justice William
Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma, 42 Micr. L. RE:v. 803 (1944); Levin, Mr.
Justice William Johmson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MIcn. L. REv. 497 (1944).
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half of the concurring opinions and more than half of the dissents penned
by all Justices during his years on the bench. He thus did much to originate
the practice of free dissent, now for better or for worse 2 a part of Supreme
Court practice. But all the same, the total number of individual expressions was not large. Johnson concurred or dissented in 55 cases out of 977.
Yet Johnson's was a remarkable record for independence of thought
even though the number of occasions of its exercise in the Supreme Court
may have been, by modem standards, small. For Johnson was both a trial
judge and a citizen of South Carolina during the same period that he was
a Justice of the Supreme Court, and Morgan has beautifully developed the
character of a man who was never more forceful than when he was on
his home grounds. Sitting in Charleston he invalidated Jefferson's Embargo, and then topped off his defiance by engaging in a newspaper wrangle
with Jefferson's Attorney General over the correctness of his opinion.
Again, he took to the newspapers in 1822 to protest against the murderous
tactics used by a special South Carolina court of inquiry examining into an
abortive slave revolution that year. While the South Carolina slave trials
undoubtedly denied due process, if slaves were entitled to any such luxury,
they did reflect the dominant feeling of the community, and Johnson's personal standing suffered greatly in opposing them.
In these and other public controversies, Johnson's strength and his
weaknesses were the complements of each other. His pugnacity and sheer
courage took him into many a situation from which a more decorous judge
might have preferred to remain removed, at the same time that his pettishness and egocentricity made the worst of them. Thus in a bicker with
Thomas Cooper, president of the University of South Carolina, Johnson
gratuitously attacked Cooper's free thinking religious attitude; and this
from a judge who still thought himself a disciple of Thomas Jefferson!
Johnson's independence of community pressures permitted him to invalidate
a South Carolina statute prohibiting free Negro seamen, in effect, from entering the waters of the state. As dozens of South Carolina constitutionalists put pen to newsprint to attack the Justice, Johnson, in thinly veiled
anonymity, wrote a dozen or more letters to the press to elaborate on his
opinion and to denounce his detractors.
And so when the final crisis of his political and constitutional career
came, Johnson was well used to going against the tide. When the nullification movement was gaining ground in South Carolina in the 1830's, the
States Rights faction invited Johnson to give an address. They had chosen
the wrong man, as he quicldy revealed in very public correspondence. The
tariff, proclaimed Johnson, was not merely constitutional, as he firmly declared it to be, but it was also a financial benefit to the State of South
Carolina. Nullification, he declared, "is folly, . . . a silly and wicked
delusion . . . it grows out of a deliberate conspiracy against the Union."
2. This reviewer would like to be recorded as of the "for worse!' persuasion.
Dissent, as it seems to me, should be reserved for serious questions, for much of the
power of objection is dissipated when exercised on trivia.
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To another dinner, Johnson offered his toast to "the holy temple of our
Union."
On the Supreme Bench, Johnson contributed to the evolution of the
Commerce Clause as a limitation on the states; and he did make some efforts
to keep the contract clause within rational bounds, though he advocated
almost limitless expansion of that same doctrine in Fletcher v. Peck 8
by putting a purely natural law limitation on state powers. All this is
detailed by Professor Morgan and leaves an impression of a man of intellectual substance-albeit one may still believe that Johnson's greatest contribution to constitutional history was that of not obstructing Marshall
much.
Justice Johnson, this strong and cantankerous fellow, is beautifully
portrayed by Professor Morgan. Morgan's extraordinarily thorough research adds much basic material to what he had known of his subject, and
he describes the personality he has uncovered with a nice mixture of
sympathy and objectivity. His book is readable, his accomplishment very
great.
John P. Frank t
3. 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810).
t Member of the Arizona Bar.

